by Ronald
Epstein2
(Originally
published
in
Vajra
Bodhi
Sea,
March,
1975,
pp.
17?23.)
The
first
series
of
doctrinal
arguments
in
the Surangama?sutra
(T.
945) is
concerned
with
the
Buddha's
refutation
of
seven
hypothetical
locations
for
the
mind
proposed
by
Ananda.
The
arguments
are
the
first
step
in
the
development
of
the
teaching
of
the
entire
work.
A
synopsis
of
the
arguments
follows.
SETTING
When
Ananda
was
passing
a
brothel
on
his
begging
rounds,
his samadhi power
failed
him
and
a
prostitute
was
able
to
use
the
power
of
a
deviant
non?Buddhist
mantra
to
entice
Ananda
into
bed
with
her.
Since
Ananda
was
on
the
verge
of
breaking
his
vows,
it
became
necessary
for
the
Buddha
to
send
Manjusri
Bodhisattva
to
save
him.
Upon
his
return
to
the
Jeta
Park,
Ananda,
newly
cognizant
of
the
dangers
of
his
lack
of samadhi power,
requests
that
the
Buddha
teach
him
about
the
only
three
types
of samadhi he
is
familiar
with,
“wonderful
samatha,
samapatti
and
dhyana,
the
very
first
expedients
by
which
the
tathagatas
of
the
ten
directions
attained
bodhi.”
Before
answering
Ananda's
request,
the
Buddha
lays
the
groundwork
by
first
posing
a
series
of
questions
to
Ananda.
He
begins
by
inquiring
about
Ananda's
motives
for
going
forth
from
the
home
life.
Ananda
replies
that
he
had
done
so
because
he
had
fallen
in
love
with
the
world?transcending
quality
of
the
Buddha's
physical
appearance.
The
Buddha
then
informs
Ananda
that
rebirth
is
caused
by
lack
of
knowledge
of
the
pure,
bright
substance
which
is
the
nature
of
the
eternally
dwelling
true
mind
and
that
enlightenment
comes
through
the
exclusive
use
of
the
straightforward
mind.
He
then
asks
Ananda
what
he
uses
to
love
and
enjoy
the
Buddha's
physical
appearance.
When
Ananda
replies
that
he
uses
his
mind
and
eyes,
the
Buddha
then
informs
him
that
they
are
to
blame
for
his
being
trapped
in
the
conditioned
world.
In
other
words,
before
Ananda
can
understand
any
type
of
cultivation
which
leads
to
enlightenment,
he
must
first
be
able
to
distinguish
the
false
thinking
of
his
discriminating
consciousness
from
his
true
mind.
Therefore,
before
he
can
do
anything
else,
it
is
imperative
that
he
find
out
where
his
mind
and
eyes
are
located.
What
follows
are
synopses
of
Ananda's
seven
successive
attempts
to
find
a
plausible
location
for
his
mind.
Each
in
turn
is
shown
by
the
Buddha
to
be
untenable.
THE
ARGUMENTS
It
is
important
to
keep
in
mind
that,
throughout
the
arguments,
what
Ananda
is
referring
to
by
"mind"
is
neither
the
fleshly
heart3
(the
organ
inside
his
chest)
nor
his
true
mind;
he
is
referring
to
discriminating
consciousness.
Different
terms,
such
as
“the
divine
efficacy
of
the
mind”
or
“the
mind
which
totally
comprehends
and
is
able to
know”, are
used,
but
the
referent
is
the
same.
Location
One
Ananda
first
supposes
that
his
mind
is
located
inside
his
body.
Through
the
use
of
analogy
the
Buddha
shows
Ananda
that
that
cannot
be
the
case.
During
preliminary
questioning
Ananda
admits:
(1)
He
and
the
Buddha
are
inside
the
hall
and
the
hall
is
inside
the
Jeta
Park.
(2)
Since
he
is
inside
the
hall,
he
first
sees
what
is
inside
the
hall
and
then
sees
the
park
outside.
(3)
He
is
able
to
see
what
is
outside
because
the
doors
and
windows
are
open.
(4)
It
is
impossible
to
be
inside
the
hall
and
see
what
is
outside
without
being
able
to
see
what
is
inside.
The
Buddha
then
points
out
that
the
situation
just
described
is
analogous
to
Ananda's
model
of
the
mind
inside
the
body.
Ananda
is
equivalent
to
the
mind;
the
hall
is
equivalent
to
the
body,
the
doors
and
windows
to
the
perceptual
faculties
(in
this
case
the
eyes),
and
the
park
to
the
external
environment.
Ananda
has
already
admitted
that
it
is
impossible
to
see
the
park
without
first
seeing
the
inside
of
the
hall;
it
follows
that
if
the
mind
were
actually
located
inside
the
body,
it
would
be
necessary
to
see
the
inside
of
the
body
before
seeing
the
external
environment.
Since
this
is
not
the
case,
Ananda
opts
for
an
alternative
location.
Location
Two
Ananda
suggests
that
the
mind
is
located
downside
the
body,
and
he
employs
his
own
analogy
to
make
his
new
case.
He
explains
that
a
lamp
first
illuminates
the
room
it
is
in;
and,
providing
that
the
door
to
the
room
is
open,
only
afterwards
can
its
illumination
reach
the
outside.
It
can
be
readily
seen
that
Ananda’s
analogy
is
really
no
different
than
the
one
used
by
the
Buddha.
Ananda
has
merely
substituted
the
lamp
its
light
for
himself
and
his
vision.
He
concludes
that
since
we
only
see
the
external
environment
and
not
inside
of
our
bodies,
then
in
terms
of
the
analogy,
lamp
must
be
located
outside
where
it
illuminates
yard
rather
than
the
inside
of
the
room.
The
Buddha
responds
with
his
own
counter?example
and
asks
Ananda
whether
the
assembly
can
all
be
filled
when
a
single
person
eats.
Ananda
replies
that
since
our
bodies
are
separate
and
distinct
from
one
another,
such
a
situation
cannot
occur.
The
Buddha
then
argues
that
two
people,
one
eating
and
the
other
not,
can
be
compared
to
the
mind
being
outside
and
therefore
separate
from
the
body.
Employing
the
analogy
both
ways,
it
follows
that
if
when
one
person
eats
the
other
is
not
filled
up,
then
when
the
mind
knows
the
body
should
not
receive
its
knowledge.
Or,
vice
versa,
when
the
body
perceives,
the
mind
should
not
know
about
its
perceptions.
The
Buddha
then
demonstrates
that
such
a
model
does
not
fit
the
actual
situation.
He
shows
Ananda
his
hand
and
asks
him
whether
his
mind
discriminates
the
perception
of
the
hand
when
his
eyes
(part
of
his
body)
see
the
hand.
Since
Ananda
must
reply
in
the
affirmative,
he
can
no
longer
contend
that
body
and
mind
are
mutually
exclusive.
Therefore,
the
mind
cannot
be
located
outside
the
body.
Location
Three
Ananda
tries
again
by
suggesting
that
the
mind
must
be
hidden
in
the
perceptual
faculty,
in
this
case
in
the
eye.
He
claims
that
the
relation
of
the
eye?faculty
to
the
mind
is
analogous
to
that
of
eyeglasses
(lit.
crystal
bowls)4
to
the
eyes,
so
that,
just
as
vision
is
not
obstructed
by
eyeglasses,
the
discrimination
of
the
mind
follows
upon
vision
without
any
obstruction.
Here
Ananda
is
returning
to
a
model
quite
similar
to
that
of
the
original
analogy.
He
has
not
replaced
himself
inside
the
lecture
hall
by
the
eye?faculty
andreplaced
the
doors
and
windows
by
the
glasses.
There
are,
however,
two
differences.
First',
he
has
taken
care
of
the
problem
of
seeing
inside
the
hall
by
implying
that
there
are
obstructions
blocking
all
views
except
those
leading
outside,
and
second,
he
has
put
glass
in
the
doors
and
windows.
It
is
the
second
point
which
gets
Ananda
in
trouble
for
when
he
admits
to
the
Buddha
that
eyeglasses
are
seen
by
the
person
who
wears
them,
the
Buddha
then
wants
to
know
why
the
mind
does
not
see
the
eyes.
Moreover,
the
Buddha
points
out
that
if
the
eyes
were
seen,
then
according
to
the
basic
Buddhist
doctrine
of
perception,
they
would
by
definition
be
part
of
the
external
environment
instead
of
belonging
to
the
perceptual
faculties (indriya). Therefore,
regardless
of
whether
the
eyes
are
seen
or
not,
Ananda's
analogy
is
shown
to
be
inappropriate.
Location
Four
In
an
attempt
to
bolster
his
case
by
redefining
inside
and
outside,
Ananda
postulates
that
what
is
dark
is
inside
and
what
is
light
is
outside,
so
that
he
can
return
to
his
initial
contention
that
the
mind
is
located
inside
the
body.
Because
the
inside
of
the
body
has
now
been
defined
to
be
in
darkness,
the
Buddha
can
no
longer
object
that
the
mind
should
first
see
the
internal
organs.
His
mind
can
only'
see
what
is
light
through
the
orifices
of
the
body.
The
Buddha
demolishes
Ananda's
new
position
in
two
stages.
He
first
attacks
Ananda's
contention
that
what
is
seen
is
necessarily
not
internal
by
analyzing
the
darkness
which
is
seen
when
the
eyes
are
closed.
According
to
the
Buddhist
doctrine
of
perception,
the
darkness
to
be
seen
must
be
a
state
opposite
the
eye?faculty
and
therefore
outside;
therefore,
to
define
darkness
as
internal
does
not
make
sense.
Then,
taking
up
the
case
of
the
darkness
which
is
seen
when
the
eyes
are
open,
such
as
in
a
pitch-black
room,
the
Buddha
points
out
that,
if
Ananda
contends
that
all
darkness
is
internal,
then
everything
in
a
pitch?black
external
environment
must
then
be
considered
as
the
inside
of
one’s
body.
The
Buddha
then
anticipates
Ananda's
possible
objection
that
the
eye?faculty
might
also
come
into
contact
with
an
internal
state
to
produce
the
"seeing"
of
internal
darkness,
so
that
even
though
the
darkness
of
the
room
might
be
external,
some
darkness
could
still
be
internal.
But
if
such
an
inward
opposite
is
postulated
for
the
case
of
the
darkness
which
is
seen
when
the
eyes
are
closed,
then
when
the
eyes
are
open,
the
Buddha
points
out,
the
inward
opposite
should
not
disappear.
And
so
it
ought
to
be
possible
to
see
one's
own
face.
The
argument
seems
to
be
that
if
you
can
see
internal
darkness
and
external
light,
then,
although
the
face
cannot
be
seen
as
part
of
the
illuminated
external
world,
it
ought
to
be
seen
as
an
illuminated
internal
opposite.
Or
to
put
it
the
other
way
around,
since
when
you
open
your
eyes
and
see
the
illuminated
external
environment,
you
are
unable
to
turn
your
vision
around
to
see
your
face,
why
should
you
suppose
that
when
your
eyes
are
closed
you
turn
your
vision
around
to
see
the
darkness
inside
your
body?
If
one's
own
face
could
be
seen??if
it
had
become
part
of
the
normally
seen
external
environment??it
would
have
to
be
external
to
one's
eyes
and
mind.
Since
the
face
is
part
of
the
body,
the
eyes
and
mind
would
then
have
to
float
in
empty
space,
external
to
the
body.
The
Buddha
continues
to
explain
to
Ananda
that
if
his
eyes
and
mind
are
not
part
of
his
body,
then
his
body
is
just
one
in
a
class
of
external
objects
which
are
all
seen
in
the
same
way.
Or
vice
versa,
if
one
still
considers
them
part
of
one's
body,
then
other
minds
and
eyes
external
to
one's
body
should
be
considered
in
the
same
way.
Therefore,
the
Buddha
concludes
that
it
should
be
the
case
that
“the
tathagata,
who
now sees your
face,
ought
also
to
be
part
of your body.”
In
the
second
part
of
his
refutation
the
Buddha
shifts
his
focus
from
what
is
seen
to
the
one
who
sees.
He
points
out
that
if
the
eyes
and
mind
are
separate
from
the
body,
then
if
one
locates
awareness
in
the
eyes
and
mind,
the
body
is
left
without
awareness.
If
one
insists
that
both
have
their
own
separate
awarenesses,
and
accordingly
two
different
stores
of
knowledge,
then
since
two
different
sets
of
consciousness
are
involved,
there
should
be
two
different
people.
Therefore,
the
Buddha
concludes
“in
your
one
body
you
should
become
two
Buddhas.”5
Location
Five
Because
he
has
had
little
success
with
his
own
considerations,
Ananda
now
attempts
to
apply
his
knowledge
of
the
Buddha's
teaching
about
conditioned
causes
to
the
problem.
He
concludes
that
the
mind
has
no
definite
location
but
comes
into
existence
by
uniting
with
the
necessary
and
sufficient
causes
for
its
existence
regardless
of
their
location.
The
Buddha
discusses
the
ramifications
of
Ananda's
new
view
in
terms
of
the
substance
and
location
of
the
mind.
(1)
If
the
mind
is
without
substance,
it
either
(a)
lacks
location,
or
(b)
haslocation.
(2)
If
the
mind
has
substance,
then
(a)
to
be
in
accord
with
conditions
it
must
have
a
definite
locus
as
it
moves
from
one
set
of
conditions
to
the
next,
and
(b)
it
must
be
comprised
either
of
a
single
substance
which
pervades
the
body
or
of
multiple
substances.
(la)
If
the
mind
has
no
substance
of
its
own,
it
makes
no
sense
to
talk
about
it
uniting
with
something
else.
(lb)
Were
it
to
have
location
without
substance,
it
would
be
outside
of
the
eighteen
elements (dhatus), which
is
doctrinally
impossible.6
(2a)
By
referring
to
the
case
of
pinching
one's
body,
the
Buddha
further
shows
that
it
is
not
logical
to
talk
about
a
mind
that
has
substance
but
no
definite
location.
According
to
Ananda's
theory,
the
mind
cannot
exist
until
the
proper
conditions
arise.
Since
a
pinch
is
located
on
the
boundary
between
internal
and
external,
then
previous
to
the
arising
of
the
proper
conditions
for
the
mind
to
exist
at
that
location,
the
substance
of
the
mind
must
be
located
either
inside
or
outside
the
body,
positions
which
have
already
been
refuted.7
At
this
point
Ananda
makes
a
basic
objection
to
the
Buddha's
argument
and
states
that
it
is
the
eyes
which
see
and
the
mind
which
knows.
The
eyes
do
not
know
and
the
mind
does
not
see.
To
point
out
the
fallacy
in
Ananda's
assertion,
the
Buddha
returns
to
location
one,
and
asks
Ananda
whether
the
door
of
the
room
is
able
to
see.
He
further
points
out
that
if
the
eyes
were
able
to
see,
as
long
as
they
are
intact,
they
should
be
able
to
function
after
the
death
of
the
body.8
(2b)
The
Buddha
then
turns
to
exploring
the
possible
characteristics
of
the
substance
of
the
mind
which
Ananda
has
proposed.
Returning
to
the
example
of
the
pinch,
he
asserts
that
if
the
mind
is
composed
of
a
single
substance
which
pervades
the
body,
then
the
pinch
should
be
discriminated
not
only
at
its
actual
location,
but
wherever
the
mind
extends
(i.e.,
over
the
entire
body).
If
on
the
other
hand
the
mind
is
composed
of
more
than
one
substance,
then,
as
already
has
been
established
above
(see
Location
Four),
there
cannot
be
a
single
person.
Were
the
mind
a
single
substance
and
not
totally
pervasive,
then
when
you
touch
your
head
and
foot
at
the
same
time,
it
should
be
impossible
to
be
aware
of
both
at
the
same
time.
Thus
the
possibilities
of
Ananda's
fifth
location
are
exhausted.
Location
Six
Ananda
now
suggests
that
the
mind
is
located
in
the
middle,
but
does
not
indicate
clearly
what
he
means.
The
Buddha
then
demonstrates
that
the
location
of
anything
which
has
an
appearance
("representation”)
is
merely
relative,
so
that
the
middle
cannot
be
considered
any
definite,
specific
location.
Existence
without
"representation",
he
says,
is
the
same
as
nonexistence.
However,
Ananda
then
clarifies
his
statement
t
saying
that
by
"middle"
he
means
inbetween
the
perceptual
faculty
and
its
perceptual
object
(visaya). He
claims
that
since
the
Buddha
taught
that
consciousness
arises
between
the
two,
that
consciousness
must
constitute
the
location
of
the
mind.
The
Buddha
destroys
Ananda's
argument
by
considering
whether
the
mind's
substance
includes
those
of
the
faculty
and
its
perceptual
object.
Here
the
Buddha
returns
to
an
argument
similar
to
that
already
established
(see
Location
Four)
about
the
impossibility
of
the
mind
consisting
of
two
different
substances
that
are
aware.
But
in
the
present
case,
one
substance,
the
faculty,
is
aware,
and
the
other,
the
perceptual
object,
is
not.
If
the
mind
includes
both,
then
“things
and
[the
mind’s]
substance
become
a
chaotic
mixture.”
Location
Seven
In
his
final
attempt
to
find
a
location
for
the
mind,
Ananda
suggests
that
non?attachment
to
everything
is
the
mind,
and
so
it
should
not
be
considered
as
having
any
definite
location.
However,
the
Buddha
shows
Ananda
that
non-attachment
implies
something
which
exists
and
has
characteristics
(such
as
non?attachment)
and
therefore
location.
Having
a
definite
location
is
a
form
of
attachment,
and
so
Ananda's
argument
collapses.
----------
NOTES
1
The
bulk
of
the
article
is
taken
with
only
minor
changes
from
the
author's
Ph.D.
Dissertation
"the
Surangama-sutra
with
Tripitaka
Master
Hsuan-hua's
Commentary
An
Elementary
Explanation
of
Its
General
Meaning"
University
of
California,
Berkeley,
1975.
2 Originally
published
under
the
Buddhist
Chinese
name
‘I
Kuo-jung’.
3
Hsin(=Skt.,
citta).
The
character
generally
translated
''mind"
is
the
same
as
that
used
for
the
physical
heart
organ.
Both
in
India
and
China,
the
heart,not
the
brain,
was
generally
thought
to
be
the
seat
of
discrimination
4
Although
eyeglasses
were
a
later
invention
and
unknown
In
India
or
China
at
the
time,
they
are
introduced
by
Tripitaka
Master
Hsuan?hua
in
his
commentary
on
the
section
in
order
to
make
the
argument
clearer
for
themodern
reader.
5
The
reference
is
presumably
to
the
rupakaya
and
not
to
the
dharmakaya.
6
i.e.
Since
the
eighteen
dhatus
are
comprehensive,
they
1eave
no
imaginable
possibility
for
further
states
of
existence.
7
See
the
arguments
for
Locations
One
and
Two.
8
For
the
Buddhists,
death
is
defined
as
the
body's
permanent
loss
of
the
consciousness.